Using data on over 6000 loans issued to US firms between 1990 and 2004, we find that lower takeover defenses (as proxied by lower G-index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)) significantly increase the cost of bank loans for a firm. Firms with lowest takeover defense (democracy) pay 25% higher spread on their bank loans as compared to firms with the highest takeover defense (dictatorship) after controlling for various firm and loan characteristics. Further investigations indicate that banks charge higher loan spread to firms with higher takeover vulnerability mainly because of their concern about substantial increase in financial risk after the takeover. Our results are robust to a variety of alternative model specifications and other proxies of takeover defenses. Our results have important implications for understanding the link between a firm's governance structure and its cost of capital.
Introduction
The ability to raise capital is vital for the existence of any business. Even small changes in the cost of capital can lead to large shifts in capital allocations and thus affect the health of the economy as a whole. Factors that influence the cost of capital are therefore of immense economic significance. Recent literature documents that shareholder rights is one such important factor.
1 Countries with better legal protection of shareholders enjoy higher stock market valuations, more listed firms, and easier access to external financing. 2 Within the US, firms differ in the level of rights that their shareholders enjoy. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) document that firms with stronger shareholder rights on average earn higher equity returns. Other studies show that governance structure also matters in bond markets (for example, see Sengupta (1998) , Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) , Cremers, Nair and Wei (2004) and Klock, Mansi and Maxwell (2004) ).
However, existing evidence on the effect of corporate governance on the cost of capital ignores private sources of financing such as bank debt.
3 Bank debt is an important source of debt financing even for large public companies. Houston and James (1996) report that the average proportion of bank debt to total debt in their sample of public companies is 64%
with a majority of firms exclusively relying on bank debt. Bradley and Roberts (2003) show that the amount of private debt issued by corporations overwhelms the amount of public debt. Also, holding concentrated position in private assets allows banks to overcome the free rider problem as well as eliminate duplication of effort in monitoring. Therefore, banks themselves govern managers by monitoring their actions. Given the importance of banks in allocating capital to corporations as well as their role in the firm-level governance, a clear understanding of how corporate governance affects the terms of bank lending is undoubtedly needed.
1 For a survey on corporate governance, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Becht, Bolton and Roell (2003) .
2 These central findings were documented by the property rights literature -see La Porta et. al. (1997 , 1998 , 2000 , 2002 .
3 There exists rather small literature that studies the effect of creditor rights protection on the bank lending terms. Esty and Megginson (2003) examine how creditor rights protection affects the size and concentration of lending syndicates using a sample of internationally syndicated project finance loans. Bae and Goyal (2004) show that banks charge higher loan rates in countries where property rights are weaker.
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This paper analyzes the relationship between firm-level corporate governance measured by the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003, henceforth GIM) and the cost of bank loans issued to publicly traded firms. We employ G-index since it is transparent, easily reproducible, and it lets us parallel our work with the literature on the effect of shareholder rights on equity and public debt.
4 Using a panel data set of over 6000 loans issued to a wide cross-section of US firms between 1990 and 2004 we show that firms that are more vulnerable to takeovers (i.e., firms with higher shareholder rights) are charged significantly higher loan spreads. To quantify this result, we follow GIM and construct corner portfolios of firms with the highest (democracy) and the lowest levels (dictatorship) of shareholder rights. We show that for a typical firm in our sample a switch from the democracy to the dictatorship portfolio decreases the expected loan spread by almost 25%
(30 basis points) after controlling for the default risk as well as various firm-level factors and specific features of loan contracts.
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Why are banks concerned about takeovers? Economic theory and intuition suggest that a lender can either benefit or lose in the event of its borrower's takeover depending on whether the default risk of the target decreases or increases after the takeover. First, takeover can increase the financial-risk of the target firm if it is accompanied by a large increase in leverage.
Thus the lenders of the target firms may stand to lose in takeovers. This is more likely to be the case for firms with lower leverage to begin with. Several empirical studies show that target firm's leverage increases significantly after the takeover (see Kim and McConnell (1977) , Cook and Martin (1991) , Warga and Welch (1993) , and Ghosh and Jain (2000) as well as Cremers and Nair (2004) for some recent evidence). Thus it can be argued that the takeover vulnerability is priced by lenders because of the likelihood of an increase in financial risk of target firms (through increase in leverage) consequent to merger. 6 On the other hand, important, it is well known (Berger and Udell (1990) , John, Lynch and Puri (2003) ) that firms with lower financial risk are able to borrow at favorable non-price terms such as unsecured loans or loans with fewer restrictive covenants as compared to firms with relatively higher financial risk. Thus, lack of collateral and protective covenants can be taken as yet another proxy for borrowers with low credit risk at the time of loan origination and these results lend further support to the increase in financial risk hypothesis.
Apart from specific contractual provisions, banks can protect their interests by having bargaining power over their borrowers (see Jandik and Makhija (2005) ). If banks have higher bargaining power, they can extract rents in takeover deals, alleviating their concern about the takeover vulnerability. We argue that banks are likely to use both ex-ante (price and covenants) and ex-post measures (bargaining power) to protect themselves from their borrowers' leverage-increasing takeovers. To investigate the bargaining power hypothesis further, we analyze the effect of syndicate size, a proxy for the number of banking relationships, on the pricing effect of takeover vulnerability.
A bank can have a significant bargaining power over the borrowing firm if it is the sole provider of bank-capital or if the firm has few other banking relationships. Such a bank can protect its interests better at the time of takeover and potentially demand a lower return for bearing the takeover risk. However, at the same time takeovers may disrupt the lender-borrower relationship and reduce the value of the information acquired by the bank during the lending process (see Petersen and Rajan (1994) ). Assuming that the lower number of banking relationships entails higher investments per bank in the lender-borrower relationship technology, these banks have an incentive to charge higher spreads to capture their relationship-specific rents as early as possible. Furthermore, if loans with single or lower number of lenders in the syndicate are less risky, then the increase in financial risk channel also predicts higher loan-spread for these loans. 9 In the end, it remains an empirical question to assess whether a small syndicate size is associated with lower spread consistent with bargaining power hypothesis or higher spread consistent with early capitalization of relationship-specific rents hypothesis. We find that the effect of takeover vulnerability is significantly higher for loans with smaller syndicate size, which shows that the relationshiprent channel is an important consideration in bank-loan pricing. To the extent that nonsyndicated loans are less risky, this result is also consistent with financial risk channel.
Our results are robust to a variety of alternative model specifications. We corroborate our findings using the entrenchment index of Bebchuck et. al. (2004) as well as the takeover defense index of Cremers and Nair (2003) . As an independent proxy of takeover risk, we analyze the impact of Delaware incorporation on the bank loan spreads. It is well documented that during the time period covered in our study Delaware incorporated firms have been targets of more takeover attempts than firms incorporated in any other state in the US.
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We find that loans issued to Delaware incorporated firms carry average spreads that are 11 basis points higher than the spreads on loans issued to firms incorporated in states other than Delaware. This is a rather striking finding, since Delaware incorporated firms tend to have lower credit risk and, therefore are expected to pay far less for bank loans.
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One of the big concerns with our results is the possibility of an endogenous relationship between the takeover exposure and loan spreads. For example, any omitted variable correlated both with firm-level risk factors and with the governance structure would bias our estimates in the loan pricing models. We address the endogeneity issue with a battery of tests motivated by economic arguments and alternative econometric models. As a starting point, we use an instrumental variable (IV) regression to model takeover risk and loan-spread in a two-stage least squares regression framework. For every firm in our sample we use the average level of the takeover index for all firms in the same industry (according to the FamaFrench industry classification) as the instrument for the firm's takeover exposure and show that our results are robust to this specification. We employ a change regression technique as our next test. 12 Change regressions have the ability to control for time-invariant firm-specific unobservable characteristics, which make them less likely to suffer from endogeneity biases. 11 Daines (2001) and Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) argue that Delaware incorporated firms tend to be larger, more established firms with better credit rating. In our sample also, based on Altman's Z -score, we find that Delaware incorporated firms are a better credit risk then non-Delaware incorporated firms.
12 Unfortunately, due to the well-known persistence in takeover index we find only a small fraction of our base sample with any changes in GIM-index in a given year. More details on the change regression are given in section 4.2.
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Consistent with our pooled regression results, we find that firms experiencing an increase in the takeover exposure are charged higher loan spreads.
Any IV regression faces the challenge of finding a good instrument that is correlated with one endogenous variable (governance structure in our case) and not with the other (loan spread) variable by itself. The task is especially difficult when we analyze the governance structure of firms. Researchers for long have suggested exploiting heteroscedasticity in data to achieve identification in models where it is hard to find good instruments (see Rigobon (2003)). We employ this technique to estimate our model and show that our results are robust to this specification. We use heteroscedasticity in loan spreads arising from changes in the credit-spread in the economy to achieve identification in our model.
Finally, we address the issue of the missing default risk factor by directly analyzing the relationship between the takeover exposure and actual defaults among the US firms. We collect data on all corporate bankruptcies between 1990 and 2004 and estimate a hazard model to assess the effect of takeover exposure on the future probability of failure. After controlling for the firm-level characteristics that we use in our loan-pricing regression, we find no meaningful relation between the takeover index and default likelihood. In sum, we conclude that our results are unlikely to be an outcome of an endogenous relation between governance structure and some omitted risk factor.
Our results complement the results in Klock, Mansi and Maxwell (2003) and Cremers, Nair and Wei (2004) and taken together with these papers, shed light on the impact of shareholder rights on the cost of debt. However, both of these papers focus on the effects of shareholder rights on the ex-post realized bond returns, while we study how shareholder rights affect the at-issuance credit spread on bank loans. Bank loans are priced by the loan officers with in-depth knowledge of the company and, therefore are more information efficient than publicly traded bonds.
13 Taken together with these papers and the earlier work of GIM, we conclude that governance structure has important implications for a firm's cost of capital.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our data and variables, and gives the summary statistics. Our main results and discussion are presented 13 Altman, Gande and Saunders (2004) report evidence that loan market is more informationally efficient than the bond market around loan default dates and bond default dates. 6 in Section 3. Section 4 reports robustness tests. We conclude in Section 5.
Data and Descriptive Statistics

Sources of data
The data used in our paper falls into three main categories: data on bank loans, data used to construct firm-specific balance sheet variables, and data used to construct the measures of shareholder rights or takeover vulnerability. Data on bank loans is obtained from Dealscan by GIM to construct G-index are now available for the years 1990 years , 1993 years , 1995 years , 1998 years , 2000 years , 2002 years and 2004 
Control variables
Throughout this paper we use the governance index of GIM as a proxy for the firm's shareholder rights, our key explanatory variable. An alternative interpretation of the G-14 This index is available from Andrew Metrick's web site (2005) . 15 GIM report an average change of 0.60 in the shareholder rights index, G, per year while the median change is zero.
16 In order to prevent a possible selection bias, we check that there are no systematic differences between Dealscan observations that could be matched and those that could not. We find that the distribution across types of loans, the average pricing of each type of loan, the average contractual maturity and the average loan size are all similar for both samples. index, often used by GIM and others, is that it effectively measures the level of takeover defenses that firms have. We find this interpretation of the governance index to be better suited for our purposes and, therefore, create a new variable takeover ≡ 24 − G. By construction takeover is just an inverse of G-index and, therefore, higher values of takeover correspond to lower number of anti-takeover provisions in the corporate charter and higher vulnerability of being taken over in future. Following GIM we also consider two corner portfolios of firms sorted on G or alternatively takeover : democracy (G ≤ 5 or takeover ≥ 19) and dictatorship (G ≥ 14 or takeover ≤ 10).
We use several firm-specific characteristics to control for their impact on loan spread. We use the logarithm of market capitalization (logmktcap) as a measure of firm's size. Larger firms tend to be more established and thus have easier access to both internal and external financing. In addition, since firm's age and size are positively correlated, larger firms are likely to have developed a reputation over time. Therefore, larger firms are likely to borrow from banks on better terms. Size can also proxy for the default risk of the firm. Another important firm-level characteristic for loan pricing is profitability, since firms with higher current profits should be able to borrow at better terms from the banks. We define profitability as a ratio of EBITDA to the sales of the firm, ebitda/sales.
We include the firm's leverage ratio in our model since highly levered firms face a higher probability of default all else remaining equal. We expect a positive association between leverage and loan spread. We define leverage as the ratio of long-term debt plus short-term debt to the total assets (leverage). Furthermore, for each firm we construct the Altman's Z -score as an accounting measure of a firm's probability of default, altmanz. Again, a low Zscore should lead to a higher cost of debt financing. Since Altman's Z -score already contains a measure of firm leverage, we follow Graham et. al. (1998) and construct a modified version of Altman's Z -score without leverage, maltmanz. We include either altmanz or leverage together with maltmanz score in our model. We also control for industry effects by including industry dummies based on FamaFrench industry classification and time period effects by using dummies for the year of loan initiation.
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Finally, we include term-spread and credit-spread to control for the macroeconomic conditions that may affect bank-loan pricing. In all the regressions, we report robust t-statistics that adjust for the clustering at the firm level. 19 Loans that list financing acquisitions as primary purpose are taken by the borrowers to finance acquisition of other firms or assets.
Descriptive statistics
20 Results are robust to the inclusion of fixed effects based on two-digit SIC codes instead. 21 As GIM point out, there are few changes over time in the Governance Index, and the inclusion of firm fixed effects would force identification of the G-index from only these changes. Hence we use panel regressions with year fixed effects and obtain standard errors by clustering at firm level. Loans in our sample essentially fall into one of the two main categories: term-loans and loan-commitments which are also known as lines of credit or revolvers. Term loans are mostly variable rate contracts that are typically priced as a markup over a market interest rate such as LIBOR or the prime rate. They are generally used to finance long-term investments.
Loan commitments are more relationship-based and are commitments to provide loans up to a certain limit. They are mostly used to finance short-term working capital needs. Borrowers often pay a commitment fee for the option to draw funds from the bank on short notice.
22
If the borrower decides to use these funds, she pays interest on the amount drawn. Medium and small size firms are most likely to use loan commitments for short-term financing. Large US firms increasingly utilize commercial paper for short-term unsecured financing but still purchase credit lines from banks to back-up this commercial paper. Therefore, large firms rely on banks mainly for contingent credit and the loan commitments fit this need.
Loan commitments with maturity greater than one year are the most popular type of bank loans, with 51.39% of the sample loans being of this type. This is not surprising given that most of the bank lending takes place through loan commitments. 364-day loan commitments comprise 25.68% of the sample. These 364-day loan commitments are popular with banks because they do not need to set aside risk capital for unfunded commitments with a duration of less than one year. Term loans form 15% of the sample, while loan commitments with maturity of less than one year comprise 2.13% of the sample. The rest comprises miscellaneous types of loans.
General corporate purposes, a catch-all name for the firm's fund requirements, is the most often stated purpose for the bank loans in our sample with 41% of the loans falling into this category. Debt repayment and commercial paper backup, each at 20%, are the next popular stated purpose of the loans in our sample. 16% of the loans cite financing acquisitions as the stated purpose (i.e. borrower company uses these loans to finance acquisitions of some other company or assets).
In addition to the price terms of the loan, Dealscan has information on some of the non-price terms of the loan like loan size, maturity, and some quantitative covenants. For 22 These fees are included in our loan pricing analysis.
roughly half of our sample (3391 out of 6468 loans), Dealscan also provides information on whether the loan is secured by collateral or not. Collateral is important since it reduces the loan risk by giving the bank a legal claim against a well-defined set of assets. Out of 3391 loans for which this information is available, 1731 are secured and the rest are unsecured.
Dealscan has limited information on some other covenants in the bank loan such as debt, equity and asset sweeps. These sweeps require the firm to repay the loan from the proceeds of debt issuances, equity issuances and asset sales respectively. This information is available for only a quarter of the loan sample.
Panel A of Table 2 presents mean, median and standard deviation of loan characteristics, firm characteristics and macroeconomic variables. Table 2 shows that the median facility of loans in our sample is $200 million, while the mean facility is about $421 million. This indicates that loans in our sample are large and that the entire sample itself, which has approximately two and a half trillion dollars in loans, is economically significant.
Since our main result is based on the takeover vulnerability of sample firms, we first investigate the extent of takeover involving large publicly traded firms as the target during our sample period. We analyze the sample of all successful mergers involving publicly traded targets in the US following the criteria used by Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003) .
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We find a total of 2,413 deals involving publicly traded targets during 1990-2003 period.
Though the median deal value is $176 million indicating that a majority of these deals involved relatively smaller firms, we do find a substantial number of targets that are similar in size to our sample firms with bank-loan data. There are 25% (about 600 firms) of targets with more than $631 million in deal value; 10% (about 240 firms) of them with more than $2.3 billion in deal value. Thus, a significant number of medium and large capitalization firms have also been the targets of takeovers during our sample period. For our sample of 1274 firms, the mean and median market capitalizations are $2.6 billion and $811 million, respectively. When we compute these statistics based on loan-level data (with potentially multiple loans per firm) the median market capitalization works increases to $1.53 billion (Panel A of Table 2 ) due to higher number of loans for larger firms in the sample. Comparing these numbers with the median deal value of publicly traded target firms, we note that there has been considerable takeover activity in the size group relevant to our sample. Further, these are only the successful transactions and thus, only a lower bound on the number of takeover bids.
Other descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that the loans in our sample appear to be mostly medium term, with the mean and median maturity equal to 39 and 36 months respectively. Finally, the mean value of the governance index, G, is equal to 9.53 (or alternatively, takeover has a mean of 14.47) while its standard deviation is equal to 2.6.
Both numbers are similar to those reported by GIM. Table 2 presents correlations of takeover with loan and firm-specific characteristics. We find that takeover is positively correlated (13.52%) with the loan spread aisd.
Panel B of
24 Other univariate correlations show that banks charge higher spread for smaller loans and loans with longer maturity. Smaller firms, less profitable firms, firms with high leverage and higher credit risk (proxied by lower Altman's Z -score) pay higher spread. Interestingly, takeover is positively correlated with Altman's Z -score, indicating that firms with a higher takeover vulnerability are less likely to default compared to firms with a lower takeover vulnerability. This is an encouraging result since it suggests that our measure of takeover vulnerability is unlikely to simply proxy for borrowers with high default risk. We return to this negative correlation between takeover vulnerability and default risk when we discuss the possibility of an omitted risk factor correlated with governance structure driving the results. Hazard models for default prediction presented in Table 11 also are in line with the correlation presented here.
Results
Empirical results: The effect of takeover risk on loan pricing
We study the impact of the shareholders rights on loan spread by estimating a regression with the natural log of the loan spread, aisd, as the dependent variable. 25 To draw meaningful inferences, we control for firm's default risk, various loan-features and other important factors that may influence a bank's decision to charge higher or lower spread. In this section we present our base model in a simple linear regression framework. In later sections we deal with the potential endogeneity problem between the governance structure and loan-spread and attempt to establish a proper causation between these two variables.
We start with our main finding that relates the loan spread to shareholders rights proxied by takeover. The multivariate regression results of Model 1 in Table 3 indicate that the takeover vulnerability index has strong power in explaining variations in loan spreads. The coefficient on takeover is positive and significant both statistically and economically. It shows that, on average, firms with higher vulnerability to takeovers (equivalently firms with higher shareholders rights or lower takeover defenses) pay higher spreads on bank loans.
To estimate the economic significance of this result, we examine a predicted decline in loan spreads that would happen if a firm were to change the number of provisions in its corporate charter by one standard deviation, which is approximately equal to three provisions. Based on the estimates from Model 1 of Table 3 , adding three provisions decreases the credit spread by 10% (or 12 basis points). To parallel our findings to those of GIM, we also look at the average decline in loan spreads if a firm were to switch from the democracy to the dictatorship portfolio. Strikingly, such a switch would result in almost 25% or 30 basis points decline in loan spreads. For the median loan size of $200 million, this equals $500,000 a year in interest savings.
In unreported regressions, we also estimate the effect of the individual governance subindexes on loan pricing. In line with our result for the G-index, those individual subindexes that increase firm's anti-takeover defenses namely Delay, Protection, Other, and State, are negatively priced. While the magnitude of the effect varies across these subindexes, all regression coefficients are both statistically and economically significant. The Voting subindex, which weakens the anti-takeover defenses, is positively priced with insignificant t-statistics.
Our other results show that market capitalization has a strong negative and significant relation with loan spread. This is to be expected since firms with high market capitalization are large and well-established firms that on average represent a low credit risk. In addition, firms with high ebitda/sales pay lower interests, while firms with lower Z-score (higher probability of default) pay higher interests on loans. All these results are consistent with the intuitive hypothesis that firms with higher default risk pay higher interest on their loans.
Non-price terms of the loan contract are equally important in explaining the cross-section of loan spreads. Loans with longer maturity carry higher interest rates. In a similar vein, term loan dummy ltterm is positive and significant indicating that term loans are priced differently from loan commitments. Performance pricing dummy is positive but is not significant in explaining the variation in loan spreads. We find that controlling for other variables loan spread increases with the syndicate size, but this relation is insignificant (see the coefficient on numsynd in Model 1 and 2 of Table 3 ). Interestingly in Model 3 when we drop leverage from the control variables the coefficient on numsynd increases, which suggests that loans with large number of syndicate members are more likely to be riskier than loans with fewer syndicate members.
In the next section we attempt to enrich our understanding of the channel through which takeover defenses or lack thereof affects loan spread.
Takeover channel Leverage Effect
As mentioned earlier, we hypothesize that banks charge higher loan spread to borrowers with higher shareholders rights because of their concern with an increase in the firm's financial risk consequent to takeover. Firms with low leverage at the time of loan origination are more likely to be the targets of leverage-increasing takeovers and banks may charge them higher spread to protect themselves against this risk. On the other hand, for borrowers with high leverage, co-insurance channel may dominate. We break our sample into three groups based on their leverage and create two dummy variables: (a) low leverage that takes a value of one for firms in the lower tercile, zero otherwise, and (b) high leverage that takes a value of one for firms in top tercile and zero otherwise.
In Model 1 of Table 4 , we include the interaction of low leverage with takeover in addition to takeover by itself. The coefficient on takeover is positive and significant as before, indicating that firms that are exposed to higher takeover risk pay higher spreads on the bank loans. Interestingly, the interaction term takeover × low leverage is also positive and significant, suggesting that banks are concerned about leverage increasing takeovers and therefore charge higher spread to low leverage borrowers.
In Model 2, in addition to the low leverage × takeover interaction we also include the interaction of high leverage × takeover. Thus the coefficient on the interaction terms should be interpreted as the marginal effect of leverage as compared to firms in the middle group.
As before, we find a positive and significant coefficient on takeover × low leverage. But, the coefficient on takeover ×high leverage is close to zero and is not significant. All other results remain similar to our base model. It is worth noting that if takeover index is merely a proxy for some (omitted) high default risk factor, then the coefficient on takeover ×high leverage, which would magnify the effect of omitted risk factor embedded in takeover vulnerability, should be positive and significant and not marginal or insignificant as we find.
Maturity Effect
We hypothesize that takeover risk would be a bigger concern for loans with longer maturity because all else remaining equal, the probability of the firm being taken over increases with the life of the loan. Table 5 explores the impact of maturity on takeover risk and loan pricing. As with leverage, we break our sample into three groups based on the loan maturity and create two dummy variables: (a) shortmat that takes a value of one for firms in the lower tercile of loan maturity, zero otherwise, and (b) longmat that takes a value of one for firms in top tercile of loan maturity and zero otherwise. We include an interaction variable takeover ×longmat in our regression model to understand the impact of loan maturity and takeover exposure on loan spreads. We find that the effect of takeover vulnerability increases for loans with higher maturity. This is consistent with our interpretation of financial risk channel through which takeover vulnerability gets priced in bank loans.
Loan Covenant Effect
In addition to specifying the interest, loan contracts include different covenants that stipulate the course of action to be taken in the case of events that threaten lender's ability to collect repayment. Typically loan covenants are tight and allow banks to either liquidate the loan or not renew it if the covenant is breached. 26 Given that loan contracts are very complicated and detailed, Dealscan does not code all the covenants that are included in the loan agreements, but gives information on only a few quantitative covenants such as loan security, sweeps (equity sweep, debt sweep and asset sweep), net worth covenants and a few others.
It is well known that borrowers with good credit risk can borrow with little or no covenants whereas loans given to riskier borrowers carry a number of covenants (Berger and Udell (1990) , John, Lynch and Puri (2003)). In line with the previous evidence, and consistent with the notion that good borrowers can borrow at more attractive non-price terms, we find that loans that are collateralized or have a equity, debt or asset sweep pay higher loan spreads compared to loans without the covenant. Thus absence of loan security or restrictive covenants seems to proxy for borrowers with better credit-risk at the time of loan initiation. But these borrowers may be more exposed to an increase in financial risk consequent to a merger, especially because the bank is not protected through the covenants.
To further understand the impact of covenants on takeover vulnerability and loan pricing, we interact takeover with the following dummy variables: unsecured loan (nofacsec), loan with no debt sweep (nodsweep), loan with no equity sweep (noesweep), loan with no asset sweep (noasweep). The results are presented in Models 1 to 4 of Table 6 . We find that in all the models, the interaction of takeover with the absence of covenant (unsecured, no debt sweep, no equity sweep, no asset sweep) is positive and statistically significant. These interaction results reveal that banks charge higher spread to high takeover risk borrowers with lower credit risk at the time of loan initiation, a result consistent with the financial risk channel documented before. Another related interpretation of these results is that the lack of collateral or other protective covenants increases the banks' concern about their borrowers' takeover and they charge higher spread for such loans.
Syndicate Size Effect
In our next set of tests, we explore the interaction of the syndicate size with takeover risk.
We create two dummy variables based on the number of lenders in the syndicate numsynd :
smallsynd takes a value of one if numsynd <= 3 and zero otherwise (bottom quartile) and largesynd takes a value of one if numsynd >= 15 (top quartile) and zero otherwise. We include the interaction of these variables with takeover index in our model (Table 7) . We find that banks charge higher spread to high takeover risk borrowers with smaller syndicate size. Smaller number of banking relationships may be associated with higher bargaining power for the bank. At the same time, smaller syndicate size may also reflect the fact that relationship-specific rents are higher. After all, relationship-specific rents are more likely to be present when borrower relies on only a few banks.
While it can be argued that banks can protect themselves against the takeover risk by using their higher bargaining power, there exist potentially higher relationship specific rents that may be lost in a takeover. Our empirical results are consistent with the interpretation of losses of relationship-specific rents that banks worry about. In addition, syndicate size may also proxy for the loan-specific risk. The lead bank may syndicate high-risk loans across a large number of syndicate members to diversify its own risk exposure. We find that based on Altman's Z -score, firms in smallsynd group are significantly less risky than firms in the largesynd group. Taking small syndicate size as a proxy for low credit risk, our results are again consistent with the financial risk channel interpretation.
Overall we find that the effect of takeover vulnerability is significant only for those loans that seem to be of better credit risk at the time of loan issuance: loans by low leverage firms, loans by firms that can borrow on attractive non-price terms without collateral or covenants and loans that have smaller syndicate size. Thus we conclude that banks charge higher spread to borrowers with high takeover vulnerability because of their concern with an increase in financial risk after the takeover.
Robustness Tests
In this section, we report the results of several robustness tests that further underscore our main finding that banks price takeover risk and it is not an omitted variable correlated with loan spread and governance structure that is driving our results. We focus on two potential issues: alternative proxy for takeover defenses and endogeneity.
Delaware effect
One concern about using G-index as our main proxy for shareholders rights may be the possibility of the endogeneity of the choice of G. It can be argued that the governance structure that a firm puts in place depends on a number of economic forces faced by the firm and thus firm-risk and G-index are endogenously determined. For example, our results may simply be driven by the endogenous relation between G-index and firm's default risk if firms with high risk also have lower shareholders rights (higher takeover exposure). It is worth noting that since most of the takeover defense provisions are put in place at the time of a firm's IPO, for overwhelming majority of sample firms the relevant default risk is measured later in calendar time than the determination of the governance structure. This alleviates the concern regarding simultaneous determination of these two variables.
As a starting point, we investigate the bank loan pricing of firms incorporated in Delaware.
It has been extensively argued in the literature that Delaware law may facilitate the sale of firms by reducing acquisition cost. Its takeover statute is relatively mild. In addition, its specialized courts and extensive precedents reduce both transaction costs and uncertainty associated with acquisitions. For instance, Delaware's takeover statute raises only minor barriers to hostile acquisitions (Black and Gilson, 1995) and its passage did not reduce shareholder wealth (Jahera and Pugh, 1991) . Of all states, Delaware takeover law imposes the least delay on hostile bidders (Coates, 1999) since it requires a three-rather than a fiveyear freeze-out period. Finally, Delaware's political economy also limits target manager's influence on lawmakers and judges. 27 If Delaware law reduces the cost of acquiring Delaware firms, this would increase among others: the demand for (and bidder search among) Delaware firms; the likelihood that Delaware firms will receive a takeover bid; and the probability that a given bid will be successful.
The empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. Daines (2001) Delaware firms are, on average, bigger, have better credit rating, and are perceived to be better managed firms. In our sample also, based on Altman's Z -score, we find that Delaware incorporated firms are a better credit risk then non-Delaware incorporated firms. Next, using
Delaware incorporation as an alternate proxy for takeover risk, we replicate the impact of leverage, maturity and syndicate size on loan spreads. Once again, we find that banks charge higher spread to those higher takeover risk borrowers (borrowers incorporated in Delaware) that have low leverage, longer maturity loans and smaller syndicate size. Overall, the Delaware effect in loan pricing provides further support to our claim that banks view higher probability of takeover as a priced factor.
Delaware legislators have little to gain by supporting proposed corporate law reforms intended to protect employees and managers of firms in other jurisdictions. Similarly, to the degree judges are influenced by political pressures (or the desire to increase the welfare of state citizens) Delaware judges deciding close cases about management resistance will not be affected by claims that a takeover would reduce local employment levels.
Endogeneity Concerns
It can be argued that our proxy for takeover vulnerability (GIM-index) is positively correlated with a risk-factor that we do not explicitly control for in our loan-pricing model. This may happen if a firm's governance structure is an outcome of a joint optimization problem involving several other decision variables that can potentially affect its credit risk. In such cases, based on the results provided so far we can only claim a correlation between the governance structure and loan spread, and not a causation. With such endogenous determination of governance structure and credit risk the OLS estimates may be biased and inconsistent. Our interaction results and regressions based on Delaware incorporation discussed earlier alleviate some of the endogeneity concerns. However, we directly address the issue in more detail in this section with a series of tests.
IV regression model
We start with a traditional instrumental variable regression approach to model takeover defenses and loan spreads. Ideally we need a variable that affects a firm's takeover defenses, but not the loan spread directly by itself. Rather than looking at firm-specific variables, we use the average level of takeover vulnerability, proxied by takeover, for all firms in the firm's industry according to the Fama-French industry classification as an instrument for its takeover defenses. The economic motivation behind this instrument is that industry-specific takeover environment affects an individual firm's takeover defense mechanism as well; but it affects a given firm's loan spread only through its affect on the firm's takeover vulnerability and not by itself.
In the first stage regression (unreported) with firm's takeover as the dependent variable, we find that industry's average takeover has a significant positive coefficient. In addition, when we include industry average in a regression model with loan spread as dependent variable we do not find a significant coefficient on this variable. Thus, the average level of takeover index for the industry appears to be a reasonable instrument for the firm-level takeover defense mechanisms.
Results from IV regression model are provided in Table 9 . We find a positive and significant coefficient on the takeover risk proxy, takeover. In fact, the parameter estimates 20 are slightly higher for this model as compared to the OLS estimates from the base model.
Change regression
In our next test, we perform a change regression. If we assume that the omitted firm-level variable is constant across time, then a change regression should be free of this bias. There are a number of factors that we need to take into account before running change regression.
In particular we need to account for the facts that: a) IRRC doesn't compile takeover index every year; b) firms may not issue loans every year; c) sample observations in the panel are at loan level with multiple loan observations for a firm in a given year; and d) takeover index changes very slowly even when it is available. Considering this, we first keep only one loan observation per firm per year for the change regression. 28 Next we drop observations where the takeover index remains constant for a firm across two consecutive years. We are left with 746 observations after this filtering. We compute the change in the log loan spread, ∆aisd, change in takeover index, ∆takeover and changes in firm characteristics over this time period: leverage, ∆leverage, profitability, ∆ebitda/sale, and size, ∆size. Table 10 presents the results of the change regression. In Model 1, and Model 2, we restrict attention to only those firms where the takeover index has changed by at least two points and at least three points, respectively. Change in the log loan spread is the dependent variable. We find that change in takeover exposure is positively and significantly correlated with change in loan spread, with the significance increasing in the sample where there is more dramatic change in the takeover index. So, if a firm increases its takeover defenses (decreases takeover vulnerability or shareholder rights), banks charge lower spread for the firm's loans. In Models 3 and 4 we consider all firms, but create a dummy variable, ∆ + , that takes the value of one if the takeover index has increased by at least two points (Model 3) and at least three points (Model 4). We find that compared to firms with a decrease or no change in takeover index, firms with an increase in takeover exposure pay significantly more spread on their bank loans. These results are consistent with the analysis reported earlier and gives us more confidence that our results are not driven by omitted variable biases.
Identification through heteroscedasticity
Finding suitable instruments to identify an endogenous variable is a challenging task especially for governance variables that we are concerned with. As an alternative to IV regression, researchers for long have proposed exploiting the heteroscedasticity in data to achieve identification in situations where finding a suitable instrument is not feasible. We adopt the methodology developed in Rigobon (2003) to identify our loan-pricing and takeover index equations by making use of the heteroscedasticity in the data.
The basic intuition behind these models can be described in the simple classical demand and supply equation framework. Imagine that there are two regimes from which the data comes: regimes with high and low shocks to the supply equation. In the regime with higher shocks to supply equation, it is more likely that the realizations of price and quantity follow the demand equation. This probabilistic instrumentation allows us to achieve identification.
We closely follow Rigobon (2003) to estimate the model (see Appendix I for more details).
To estimate this model, we need two regimes with considerably unequal variances in one of the two endogenous variables (loan-pricing or takeover /G-index in our case). Motivated by economic reasoning, we break our sample into two groups based on the level of creditspread (i.e., the difference between BAA and AAA bonds) prevailing at the time of loan issuance. When credit-spread is high, lenders differentiate a lot among different classes of borrowers resulting in higher variance in the loan prices. All loan observations in below median credit-spread regimes are called the low variance loan-pricing regime and the rest are classified as high-variance loan-pricing regime.
We find that the variance of loan spreads is considerably high in higher regime (114.87 bps) as compared to the lower regime (90.26 bps). Using Rigobon's approach, we write the loan-pricing and takeover index equations as two endogenous variables that can be expressed as a linear function of all explanatory variables of our model. We use all covariates that enter our base regression (Table 3) for this model specification as well. We solve for the variancecovariance matrices of the shocks to pricing and takeover index equations under these two regimes. This, in turn, allows us to estimate the parameter coefficient on the takeover variable in the loan-pricing equation. We obtain the bootstrapped standard errors by using 22 100 replicas of the original sample with replacement. In the loan-pricing model, we obtain a parameter estimate of 2.65 on the takeover risk with a t-statistics of 2.17. Note that we do not take the logarithm of loan spread for this estimation because we want to make use of the heteroscedasticity to achieve identification. Results from this alternative model is consistent with our original results that banks charge significantly higher spread to borrowers with higher takeover vulnerability.
Is takeover index a proxy for default risk?
Our final test to rule out that takeover index is merely a proxy for default risk relies on a direct model of bankruptcy prediction used widely in the default risk literature. If takeover index is simply a proxy for default risk then there should be a high degree of correlation between takeover risk and observed defaults or bankruptcies. Vice versa, if takeover index doesn't explain the observed bankruptcies or defaults then it is more likely that takeover index is not directly related to default risk. To test this, we run a hazard model for bankruptcy First, we estimate a simple logistic model with the dependent variable bankruptcy set to one if the firm has defaulted or filed bankruptcy and zero otherwise. In this model, we consider only one observation per firm with the latest available data. We use all the covariates from our base loan spread regressions in Table 3 The results of bankruptcy prediction using logistic and Cox proportional hazards model are important for two reasons. First, these results confirm that the explanatory variables that we have used in our loan spread regressions (based on past literature) do in fact capture the likelihood of default. Second, and more importantly, if takeover is simply a proxy for an omitted firm risk factor then the coefficient on takeover is expected to be positive, not negative and insignificant as we document. A minimalist interpretation of these results is that firms with high takeover index (high shareholders rights) are not more likely to default or file for bankruptcy than their low takeover index counterparts. These results underscore our main argument and highlight that an omitted firm level variable correlated with takeover may not be driving our results.
We conclude by noting that, though it is extremely challenging to provide a conclusive treatment of endogeneity concerns, these tests give us confidence that our main results are unlikely to be simply an outcome of endogenous relation between firm risk and governance structure.
Other Robustness Missing Data on Loan Security
Information on whether the loan is collateralized or not (facsec) is available only for 52%
of the 6468 loans in our sample. As pointed out earlier, firms with good credit risk are more likely to borrow without collateral compared to firms that are more risky. Model 1 of Table 12 confirms that finding. Banks charge a significantly higher spread for loans that are secured compared to loans that are unsecured. Moreover, our main finding that banks charge a higher loan spread to firms that are more vulnerable to takeover is robust to the inclusion of facsec in the regression model. In Model 2, we confirm our other findings from Table 3 that banks charge democracy firms a higher loan spread and dictatorship firms a lower loan spread. Since facsec is missing for almost 50% of the sample loans, we want to make sure that there is no systematic bias because of the missing information.
To alleviate this concern, we first run a probit regression with loan security dummy facsec as a dependent variable and firm level and loan level variables as explanatory variables. We also control for loan purpose, year and industry fixed effects. Using the coefficient estimates from this probit regression, we construct the predicted value of loan security status facsechat.
In Models 3 and 4 we repeat the analysis of Models 1 and 2 with the predicted value of facility secured status instead of the actual value (and hence we can use the entire sample of loans in the analysis). The results are qualitatively similar to the previous findings and give us confidence that missing collateral information doesn't have much bearing on our key results. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) 
Other Measures of Governance
Other Tests
In all the regressions, we have included the year dummies and Fama-French industry fixed 
Conclusion
Using the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), we investigate the effects of shareholder rights on the cost of bank loans. We find that after controlling for loan and firm specific characteristics, firms with higher takeover vulnerability (equivalently with higher shareholder rights) are charged higher loan spreads. We follow GIM and construct portfolios with the highest (democracy) and the lowest (dictatorship) levels of shareholder rights. We show that a switch from the democracy to the dictatorship portfolio decreases a firm's expected loan spread by a significant 25% (30 bps for a typical firm in our sample).
Further analysis shows that banks charge higher spread to these borrowers mainly because of their concern about an increase in financial risk of the borrowers consequent to takeovers.
Our results are robust to a variety of alternative model specifications and other proxies of "takeover readiness' provisions that boards put in place to be ready for a hostile takeover (poison pills and golden parachutes).
Appendix I: Identification Through Heteroscedasticity
We provide a brief description of the econometric model used to achieve identification through heteroscedasticity. This is adapted from Rigobon (2003) . For this estimation we de-mean all variables in the model. We regress takeover risk and loan spread on all explanatory variables of Table 3 and obtain the residuals from this regresion. Lets denote them by P for loan prices and T for the takeover risk. We express these equations in an endogenous manner as follows:
We denote the high and low credit-spread regimes by s ∈ 1, 2. For each state (s) we can express the covariance matrices from above equations in the following manner:
This provides a system of equations with six unknowns (α, β, σ
,2 ) and two covariance matrices that provide six equations (and thus we are able to achieve identification for the model). It can be shown that under mild technical conditions, the consistent estimates of α and β can be achieved by the following equations:
The standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping the original sample N times.
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Appendix II: Hazard Model for Bankruptcy
We provide a brief description of the Cox Proportional Hazards model used for bankruptcy estimation in this appendix. Shumway (2001) Let X i (t) be a 1 × K vector of covariates at time t. The vector X i (t) usually includes firmspecific variables and, a constant component representing an intercept term. Information about the firm-specific variables terminates at time T i . Let λ(t) be the default intensity function (the hazard function) or the instantaneous rate of failure.
Cox Proportional Hazards model is a semiparametric model and the hazard rate is specified as λ(t) = λ 0 (t)exp(β 0 + Xβ x ) where λ 0 t is left unspecified. Let L(β) denote the likelihood conditional on the data {X i , N i }. This is given by
where Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . Two corner portfolios correspond to democratic firms (with G-index ≤ 5) and dictatorship firms (G-index ≥ 14). Stars indicate years for which IRRC data are updated.
year G ≤ 5 G = 6 G = 7 G = 8 G = 9 G = 10 G = 11 G =12 G =13 G ≥14 All 1990 *   22  19  21  16  33  21  16  19  8  17  192  1991  16  16  23  28  18  16  13  16  9  10  165  1992  15  10  24  30  23  26  13  16  12  14  183  1993  *   26  12  26  38  26  25  35  30  20  23  261  1994  30  16  31  54  48  44  34  36  28  26  347  1995  *   30  30  28  44  70  39  44  36  29  18  368  1996  23  29  43  57  66  30  58  31  23  22  382  1997  26  40  35  70  73  43  74  39  17  37  454  1998  *   48  63  50  64  79  84  59  35  27  17  526  1999  30  36  47  65  50  89  53  44  37  20  471  2000  *   33  40  51  68  100  105  86  66  53  32  634  2001  29  45  64  73  98  89  97  83  64  36  678  2002  *   15  36  42  69  78  115  108  63  52  40  618  2003  30  31  52  77  78  92  96  60  44  33  593  2004  *   25  19  67  80  72  78  110  59  57  29  596  Total  398  442  604  833  912  896  896  633  480  374  6468 B) for the key explanatory variables used in regressions. aisd is the all-in-drawn spread on the bank loan measured over the LIBOR. loansize is the amount of the loan in millions of USD. loanmat indicates the maturity of the loan in months. The number of lenders in the syndicate is given by numsynd. takeover is defined as 24-G-index where G (GIM,2003) measures the number of provisions in the firm's charter. mktcap refers to the market capitalization of the firm in billions of USD in the month before the loan. ebitda/sales is the ratio of EBITDA of the firm to the sales of the firm. leverage is the total debt (long-term plus short-term) divided by total assets of the firm. altmanz is constructed according to Altman (1968) and maltmanz is the modified version of altmanz without the leverage. cspread is the credit spread measured as the difference of BAA and AAA yields and tspread is the term spread measured as the difference of 10-year and 1-year treasury notes. delinc is a dummy that takes the value of one if the firm is incorporated in delaware and zero otherwise This table reports results from the loan pricing regressions that use corporate charter provisions as a proxy for takeover risk, takeover, defined as the inverse of shareholder rights, takeover = 24 − G. The dependent variable is logarithm of the drawn all-in-spread, log(aisd). The explanatory variables include firm-specific, loan-specific and term-structure variables. mktcap refers to the market capitalization of the firm in billions of USD in the month before the loan. ebitda/sales is the ratio of EBITDA of the firm to the sales of the firm. leverage is the total debt (long-term plus shortterm) divided by total assets of the firm. altmanz is constructed according to Altman (1968) and maltmanz is the modified version of altmanz without the leverage. loanmat indicates the maturity of the loan in months. The number of lenders in the syndicate is given by numsynd. perfprice is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan has a performance pricing component. ltterm is a dummy variable equal to one if loan is a term loan and zero if the loan is a revolver. cspread is the credit spread measured as the difference of BAA and AAA yields and tspread is the term spread measured as the difference of 10-year and 1-year treasury notes. In models 2 and 4 we use indicator variables for democracy for which takeover ≥ 19 and dictatorship for which takeover ≤ 10. Models 3 and 4 use Altman Z-index, altmanz, while Models 1 and 2 use a combination of modified Altman Z-index, maltmanz, and leverage among the explanatory variables. Robust t-statistics controlling for firm cluster effects are reported in parenthesis. Regressions also include Fama-French industry fixed effects, year fixed effects and loan purpose indicators. This table reports results from the loan pricing regressions that use corporate charter provisions as a proxy for takeover risk, takeover, and its interaction with the firm-level leverage. The dependent variable is logarithm of the drawn all-in-spread, log(aisd). The explanatory variables include firmspecific, loan-specific and term-structure variables. mktcap refers to the market capitalization of the firm in billions of USD in the month before the loan. ebitda/sales is the ratio of EBITDA of the firm to the sales of the firm. leverage is the total debt (long-term plus short-term) divided by total assets of the firm. altmanz is constructed according to Altman (1968) and maltmanz is the modified version of altmanz without the leverage. loanmat indicates the maturity of the loan in months.
The number of lenders in the syndicate is given by numsynd. perfprice is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan has a performance pricing component. ltterm is a dummy variable equal to one if loan is a term loan and zero if the loan is a revolver. cspread is the credit spread measured as the difference of BAA and AAA yields and tspread is the term spread measured as the difference of 10-year and 1-year treasury notes. Model 1 considers interaction of takeover with lowleverage dummy that takes a value of one for firms in the lower leverage tercile and zero otherwise. Model 2 adds to Model 1 an interaction term of takeover with highleverage dummy that takes a value of one for firms in the upper leverage tercile and zero otherwise. Robust t-statistics controlling for firm cluster effects are reported in parenthesis. Regressions also include Fama-French industry fixed effects, year fixed effects and loan purpose indicators. This table reports regression coefficients from the regression that relates loan maturity to the proxy for takeover risk, takeover. The maturity of the loan (in months) is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables include firm-specific, loan-specific and term-structure variables. mktcap refers to the market capitalization of the firm in billions of USD in the month before the loan. ebitda/sales is the ratio of EBITDA of the firm to the sales of the firm. leverage is the total debt (long-term plus short-term) divided by total assets of the firm. altmanz is constructed according to Altman (1968) and maltmanz is the modified version of altmanz without the leverage. loanmat indicates the maturity of the loan in months. The number of lenders in the syndicate is given by numsynd. perfprice is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan has a performance pricing component. ltterm is a dummy variable equal to one if loan is a term loan and zero if the loan is a revolver. cspread is the credit spread measured as the difference of BAA and AAA yields and tspread is the term spread measured as the difference of 10-year and 1-year treasury notes. Model 1 considers interaction of takeover with longmat dummy that takes a value of one for loans in the upper maturity tercile and zero otherwise. Model 2 adds to Model 1 an interaction term of takeover with shortmat dummy that takes a value of one for loans in the lower maturity tercile and zero otherwise. Robust t-statistics controlling for firm cluster effects are reported in parenthesis.
Regressions also include Fama-French industry fixed effects, year fixed effects and loan purpose indicators. Each covenant dummy is equal to one if the corresponding covenant is excluded from the loan contract and zero otherwise. Each model also includes an interaction term between takeover and corresponding covenant dummy. The dependent variable is logarithm of the drawn all-in-spread, log(aisd). The explanatory variables include firm-specific, loan-specific and term-structure variables. mktcap refers to the market capitalization of the firm in billions of USD in the month before the loan. ebitda/sales is the ratio of EBITDA of the firm to the sales of the firm. leverage is the total debt (long-term plus short-term) divided by total assets of the firm. altmanz is constructed according to Altman (1968) and maltmanz is the modified version of altmanz without the leverage. loanmat indicates the maturity of the loan in months. The number of lenders in the syndicate is given by numsynd. perfprice is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan has a performance pricing component. ltterm is a dummy variable equal to one if loan is a term loan and zero if the loan is a revolver. cspread is the credit spread measured as the difference of BAA and AAA yields and tspread is the term spread measured as the difference of 10-year and 1-year treasury notes. Robust t-statistics controlling for firm cluster effects are reported in parenthesis. Regressions also include Fama-French industry fixed effects, year fixed effects and loan purpose indicators. This table reports regression coefficients from the regression that relates the size of loan syndicate to the proxy for takeover risk, takeover. The size of loan syndicate is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables include firm-specific, loan-specific and term-structure variables. mktcap refers to the market capitalization of the firm in billions of USD in the month before the loan. ebitda/sales is the ratio of EBITDA of the firm to the sales of the firm. leverage is the total debt (long-term plus short-term) divided by total assets of the firm. altmanz is constructed according to Altman (1968) and maltmanz is the modified version of altmanz without the leverage. loanmat indicates the maturity of the loan in months. The number of lenders in the syndicate is given by numsynd. perfprice is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan has a performance pricing component. ltterm is a dummy variable equal to one if loan is a term loan and zero if the loan is a revolver. cspread is the credit spread measured as the difference of BAA and AAA yields and tspread is the term spread measured as the difference of 10-year and 1-year treasury notes. Model 1 considers interaction of takeover with smallsynd dummy that takes a value of one for loans issued by the syndicate in the lower size tercile and zero otherwise. Model 2 adds to Model 1 an interaction term of takeover with largesynd dummy that takes a value of one for loans issued by the syndicate in the upper size tercile and zero otherwise. Robust t-statistics controlling for firm cluster effects are reported in parenthesis. Regressions also include Fama-French industry fixed effects, year fixed effects and loan purpose indicators. This table reports the analysis of the impact of Delaware incorporation as an alternative measure of the takeover risk on the bank loan pricing. The dependent variable is logarithm of the drawn allin-spread, log(aisd). As the explanatory variables, the base Model 1 uses Delaware incorporation dummy, delinc, and other firm-specific, loan-specific and term-structure variables. Models 2 adds an interaction of delinc with lowleverage dummy defined in Table 4 to the base model. Models 3 adds an interaction of delinc with longmat dummy defined in Table 5 to the base model. Models 4 adds an interaction of delinc with smallsynd dummy defined in Table 7 to the base model. The explanatory variables include firm-specific, loan-specific and term-structure variables. mktcap refers to the market capitalization of the firm in billions of USD in the month before the loan. ebitda/sales is the ratio of EBITDA of the firm to the sales of the firm. leverage is the total debt (long-term plus short-term) divided by total assets of the firm. altmanz is constructed according to Altman (1968) and maltmanz is the modified version of altmanz without the leverage. loanmat indicates the maturity of the loan in months. The number of lenders in the syndicate is given by numsynd. perfprice is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan has a performance pricing component. ltterm is a dummy variable equal to one if loan is a term loan and zero if the loan is a revolver. cspread is the credit spread measured as the difference of BAA and AAA yields and tspread is the term spread measured as the difference of 10-year and 1-year treasury notes. Robust t-statistics controlling for firm cluster effects are reported in parenthesis. Regressions also include Fama-French industry fixed effects, year fixed effects and loan purpose indicators. The dependent variable is logarithm of the drawn all-in-spread, log(aisd). The explanatory variables include firm-specific, loan-specific and term-structure variables. mktcap refers to the market capitalization of the firm in billions of USD in the month before the loan. ebitda/sales is the ratio of EBITDA of the firm to the sales of the firm. leverage is the total debt (long-term plus short-term) divided by total assets of the firm. altmanz is constructed according to Altman (1968) and maltmanz is the modified version of altmanz without the leverage. loanmat indicates the maturity of the loan in months. The number of lenders in the syndicate is given by numsynd. perfprice is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan has a performance pricing component. ltterm is a dummy variable equal to one if loan is a term loan and zero if the loan is a revolver. cspread is the credit spread measured as the difference of BAA and AAA yields and tspread is the term spread measured as the difference of 10-year and 1-year treasury notes. Robust t-statistics controlling for firm cluster effects are reported in parenthesis. Regressions also include Fama-French industry fixed effects, year fixed effects and loan purpose indicators. This table reports results from regressing log changes in the drawn all-in-spread, ∆aisd, on changes in takeover index, ∆takeover, firm-level leverage, ∆leverage, firm-level profitability, ∆ebitda/sales, and firm size,∆size. In forming the sample only one loan per firm (the first loan issued during the year but results are robust to randomly picking a loan from the multiple loans issued by the same firm during the same year) is considered. All observations where takeover index remained constant are omitted. Model 1 and Model 2 consider only observations for which ∆takeover ≥ 2 and ∆takeover ≥ 3 respectively. Model 3 and Model 4 use all observations with a dummy ∆ + which is equal to zero if ∆takeover ≥ 2 and ∆takeover ≥ 3 respectively and zero otherwise. Robust t-statistics controlling for firm cluster effects are reported in parenthesis. Model 1 and 2 uses takeover directly while Model 3 uses indicator variables for democracy for which takeover ≥ 19 and dictatorship for which takeover ≤ 10. mktcap refers to the market capitalization of the firm in billions of USD in the month before the loan. ebitda/sales is the ratio of EBITDA of the firm to the sales of the firm. leverage is the total debt (long-term plus short-term) divided by total assets of the firm. altmanz is constructed according to Altman (1968) and maltmanz is the modified version of altmanz without the leverage. There are 2586 observations with 178 defaults for the logistic model and 18015 observations with 178 defaults for the CPH model. Robust t-statistics are presented for both the models in parenthesis with adjustments to firm level clustering in the CPH model. Table 3 but with securitization dummy, facsec, equal to one if the loan is secured and zero otherwise. In models 2 and 4 we use indicator variables for democracy for which takeover ≥ 19 and dictatorship for which takeover ≤ 10. Models 1 and 2 use facsec dummy directly while alternative Models 3 and 4 use predicted value of facsec from first stage Probit model. The dependent variable is logarithm of the drawn all-in-spread, log(aisd). The explanatory variables include firm-specific, loan-specific and term-structure variables. mktcap refers to the market capitalization of the firm in billions of USD in the month before the loan. ebitda/sales is the ratio of EBITDA of the firm to the sales of the firm. leverage is the total debt (long-term plus short-term) divided by total assets of the firm. altmanz is constructed according to Altman (1968) and maltmanz is the modified version of altmanz without the leverage. loanmat indicates the maturity of the loan in months.
The number of lenders in the syndicate is given by numsynd. perfprice is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan has a performance pricing component. ltterm is a dummy variable equal to one if loan is a term loan and zero if the loan is a revolver. cspread is the credit spread measured as the difference of BAA and AAA yields and tspread is the term spread measured as the difference of 10-year and 1-year treasury notes. Robust t-statistics controlling for firm cluster effects are reported in parenthesis. Regressions also include Fama-French industry fixed effects, year fixed effects and loan purpose indicators. 
